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WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
and has existed continuously for not less than three months."
Even though the insured might later recover from his disability,
the presumption stated in the policy would be deemed conclusive.
The court pointed out that in its opinion there is authority sup-
porting this view and likewise authority to the contrary in
other states.
LEASE
J. Denson Smith*
The cases under this heading decided during the 1949-1950
term were not of any significance jurisprudentially. In Anglin v.
Nasif1 the court rejected an attempt by three plaintiffs, lessees, to
recover amounts claimed to have been paid by them in excess of
allowable rentals under applicable OPA regulations. Defendant
had converted an apartment renting at $45 per month into two
bedrooms, which he rented at $30 per month each plus $5 from
each of the plaintiffs for kitchen privileges. This was done with
the authority of the Shreveport Rent Director, and the conclusion
of the court was that defendant's action was not an illegal evasion
of the regulations, but a lawful avoidance.
Eviction proceedings brought in Canal Realty and Improve-
ment Company, Incorporated v. Pailet2 were dismissed as pre-
mature. After having accepted rent for the month of June, plain-
tiff instituted the eviction suit on June 27 without giving the
tenant ten days' notice that the contract was terminated because
of violations of its provisions. A notice to vacate previously given
was waived by the later acceptance of additional rent.
In the case of Salter v. Zoder3 the court, on certiorari, an-
nulled judgments of the district court and the court of appeal,
and found in favor of the plaintiff, who was suing for damages
resulting from injuries to his minor daughter. The daughter was
injured when she fell against a sheet of galvanized iron being
used to cover a stack of lumber placed in a driveway by the
defendant lessor. Plaintiff was a sub-lessee. The court found the
defendant negligent in obstructing the driveway in violation of
the rights of plaintiff and his family and in creating a condition
highly dangerous to children, knowing that the child in question
and Qthers were accustomed to play in the driveway. The deci-
sion rested on Articles 2315 and 2316 of the Louisiana Civil Code.
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1. 217 La. 392, 46 So. 2d 309 (1950).
2. 217 La. 376, 46 So. 2d 303 (1950).
3. 216 La. 769, 44 So. 2d 862 (1950).
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Justice Hamiter dissented on the ground that the proximate cause
of the accident and injury was not the stack of lumber with its
galvanized iron covering but the fact that the child tripped during
play on some other and disconnected object. He felt that if an
iron chair had been at the same place the injury could have hap-
pened just as easily.
MINERAL RIGHTS
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REVERSIONS-SERVITUDE AND LEASE
One of the interesting developments in the jurisprudence
since the last resum6 involves what the court in Gailey v. Mc-
Farlain1 termed a "reversionary interest." In that case the court
expressed the opinion that such an interest could be dealt with,
but under the test of intention had not been dealt with in the
contract under consideration.
In later cases, apparently because of obvious difficulties of
application of prescription and possible dangers to settled prin-
ciples of public policy, the court strengthened resistance to the
concept by deciding that a vendor dealing with the possibility of
reversion was simply selling something that he did not own.
During the past year, in at least three important decisions, the
court has adhered to the non-recognition policy. Long-Bell
Petroleum Company v. Tritico 2 may be said to stand for a denial
under the theory of the sale of a thing not owned; it was cited
by the court for this principle in McMurrey v. Gray.3 The latter
case is emphatic on the point and grounds strongly on the public
policy argument advanced by Chief Justice O'Niell in McDonald
v. Richard,4 wherein, incidentally, the idea was further blighted
by the word "so-called" consistently prefixing the phrase "rever-
sionary interest" used by the court in Gailey v. McFarlain.5
In Liberty Farms v. Miller,6 the court again in no uncertain
terms negates the reservation, termed a reversionary "right" in
this case, grounding in part on the theory of sale of property not
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 194 La. 150, 193 So. 570 (1940).
2. 216 La. 426, 43 So. 2d 782 (1949).
3. 216 La. 904, 45 So. 2d 73 (1949).
4. 203 La. 155, 13 So. 2d 712 (1943).
5. 194 La. 150, 193 So. 570 (1940).
6. 216 La. 1023, 45 So. 2d 610 (1950).
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